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1 
CORRECTIVE TAXATION, LEVERAGE AND COMPENSATION IN A 
BLOATED FINANCIAL SECTOR 
Tim Edgar* 
The financial crisis of 2007-2009 reinvigorated academic and policymaking interest in 
the design of prudential regulatory regimes governing the financial sector as a policy 
instrument intended to moderate financial instability. The crisis also motivated interest in 
the role of taxation as a complement to these regimes. In practice, however, the use of tax 
instruments has been modest. This paper considers three tax instruments that could serve 
this complementary role. Political economy considerations aside, it is suggested that the 
use of bank leverage taxes by policymakers as the tax instrument of choice is 
unsurprising. But as recognized in the literature, a corrective taxation case can be made 
for an increase in the rate of such taxes as an instrument to eliminate the availability of 
cheap debt for systemically important institutions. Although returns to risk taking is a 
potentially robust tax base, the weak behavioral properties of this tax instrument have 
apparently diminished its appeal for policymakers, while a revenue-raising imperative 
that might otherwise motivate its adoption is muted considerably by the adoption of a 
bank leverage tax. Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, the tax literature does not consider 
the case for an excise tax on bonus and performance-based compensation as an 
instrument to alter the structure of compensation. This may be attributable, in part at 
least, to redundancy where regulatory regimes can be used to impose constraints with 
similar intended effects.  
*Osgoode Hall Law School, York University and Faculty of Law, University of Sydney. An earlier
version of this paper was prepared for “Tax Policy for a Better Tomorrow: Intersectoral and 
Multidisciplinary Connections - A Workshop in Honor of Neil Brooks, Toronto, May10-11, 2013. 
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 Quoted in John Arlidge, I’m doing ‘God’s Work’. Meet Mr. Goldman Sachs, SUNDAY TIMES, Nov. 8, 
2009. 
2
 Quoted in Arthur Delaney, White House Adviser: AIG Deserves ‘Nobel Prize for Evil’, HUFFINGTON 
POST, Apr. 16, 2009. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In terms of likely causes, the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was not a tax story.
3
 Cleaning 
up the fiscal mess that is the result of the need to prop up the financial sector in the wake of the 
crisis is a tax story, one part of which is the use by some countries (most notably, France and the 
United Kingdom) of temporary taxes on bonus compensation as a means to address the perverse 
distributional result of the consequent income transfer.
4
 Another part of this post-crisis tax story 
emphasizes the potential for corrective or Pigovian taxes to support prudential regulatory regimes 
as the policy instrument of choice to realize a measure of financial stability.
5
 In practice, 
however, the use of special taxes on the financial sector has been very limited post crisis, with 




 See TAXATION AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi eds., 2012). 
But see Martin A. Sullivan, Deleveraging the Tax Code 120 TAX NOTES (2008) 1241 (emphasizing a 
close link between interest deductibility for income tax purposes and levels of leverage). See also Ruud de 
Mooij, Michael Keen, & Masanori Orihara, Taxation, Bank Leverage, and Financial Crises (IMF Working 
Paper WP/13/48, Feb. 2013), available at  http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/wp1348.pdf 
(finding from bank panel data for the period 2001-2009 that there is a link between an increase in the 
probability of crisis and an increase in bank leverage associated with a tax-debt bias). 
4
 The UK bonus tax appears to have raised revenue five times greater than expected, which may have been 
attributable to the grossing up of bonus pools in the presence of the temporary tax. See Brooke Masters, 
George Parker & Sharlene Goff, Supertax Pulls in £2.5bn for UK Treasury, FINANCIAL TIMES, Mar. 4, 
2010. 
5
 See e.g., Int’l  Monetary Fund [IMF] Staff, A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the Financial Sector 
[hereinafter IMF Staff, A Fair and Substantial Contribution],  in FINANCIAL SECTOR TAXATION: THE 
IMF’S REPORT TO THE G-20 AND BACKGROUND MATERIAL 2, 9-11, 47-53 (Stijn Claessens, 
Michael Keen & Ceyla Pazarbasioglu eds., Sept. 2010). 
6
 The Financial Crisis Responsibility (FCR) fee, proposed by the Obama administration, is an example of a 
bank leverage tax applicable to the principal amount of uninsured or wholesale liabilities of financial 
institutions with assets in excess of $50 billion. The FCR fee was initially proposed in January 2010 and 
was included as a proposed measure in the Administration’s Fiscal Year 2014 budget. See DEPARTMENT 
OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 
2014 REVENUE PROPOSALS 149-150 (April 2013). Several European Union (EU) member states have 
adopted comparable taxes. See EUROPEAN COMM.  (EC), CONCLUSIONS OF THE 17 JUNE 
EUROPEAN COUNCIL (2010); Julian S. Alworth & Giampaolo Arachi, Introduction in TAXATION 
AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 3, 1, 13-14; Thornton Matheson, Financial Sector Taxation 
and the Ongoing Financial Crisis [hereinafter Matheson, Financial Sector Taxation], in TAXING THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR: FINANCIAL TAXES, BANK LEVIES AND MORE (Otto Mares & Dennis 
Weber eds., 2012) 203, 205-209. 
 4 
Abstracting from the possible effect of political economy considerations,
7
 it is suggested here 
that this modest tax-policy action is unsurprising given the dominance of prudential regulation.  
More particularly, the paper makes the following four points. First, much of the post-
crisis tax literature fails to clarify how the notion of a corrective tax - in its conventionally 
understood sense in the public finance literature as a tax that is designed to impose a cost equal 
to the social marginal harm of an activity - can realize a result that is not already realized by 
prudential regulatory regimes.
8
 Second, the redundancy of corrective taxation in its 
conventionally understood sense leaves a bank leverage tax on uninsured or wholesale liabilities 
as an attractive instrument to perform a clearly specified revenue-raising function with 
behavioral properties that can be seen to support prudential regulatory regimes. Third, taxation of 
returns to risk taking in the financial sector has not had any policy traction,
9
 primarily because of 
its weak behavioral properties and an incomplete revenue-raising role in the presence of a bank 
leverage tax. Fourth, an excise tax on bonus and performance-based compensation in the 
financial sector can be justified as a policy instrument intended to induce a narrowly defined 
behavioral response.  
Parts two and three review, respectively, the related roles of leverage and compensation 
in the financial sector as sources of risk taking and financial instability. Part two begins with a 
                                                 
7
 See e.g., SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET TAKEOVER 
AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2010). 
8
 A notable exception is Michael Keen, Rethinking the Taxation of the Financial Sector, 57 CESIFO ECON. 
STUD 1, 10-20 (2011). See also Michael P. Devereux, New Bank Taxes: Why and What Will Be the Effect? 
17-20 (European Tax Policy Forum/Centre for European Policy Studies Conference on Taxes and 
Behaviour, Apr. 11, 2011), available at  http://www.etpf.org/papers/64bank.pdf  (describing choice of 
taxation or regulation of the financial sector “starting with a blank sheet of paper”); Douglas A. 
Shackelford, Daniel Shaviro, & Joel B. Slemrod, Taxation and the Financial Sector, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 
781(2010) (discussing the theory and design of corrective taxes as applied to the financial sector); Joel B. 
Slemrod, Lessons for Tax Policy in the Great Recession, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 387, 389 (2009) (suggesting 
that some insight may be gained from applying the economics of Pigovian taxes to address systemic risk). 
9
 See e.g., IMF Staff, A Fair and Substantial Contribution,  supra note 5, at 19-23, 65-69; Michael Keen, 
Russell Krelove, & John Norregaard, The Financial Activities Tax, in IMF, FINANCIAL SECTOR 
TAXATION, supra note 5, 118. 
 5 
brief account of Hyman Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis,”
10
 which describes the build-
up of excessive leverage and risk taking through the business cycle as the sources of financial 
instability that are endemic to a sophisticated market economy with financial intermediation. 
This is followed by a description in part two of Paul Woolley’s agency explanation of the asset 
mispricing identified by Minsky as the source of the kind of system-wide risk that can precipitate 
a crisis.
11
 The role of compensation structures in the financial sector is highlighted as an 
important factor that amplifies the effects of Woolley’s agency story.  
Part four examines the role of special taxes on the financial sector as a complement to 
prudential regulation in suppressing the sources of financial instability reviewed in parts two and 
three. It is suggested that the use of bank leverage taxes, as the apparent tax instrument of choice 
to suppress the use of debt, could be designed more expansively to both generate revenue 
sufficient to cover the expected direct costs of future bailouts and to eliminate the borrowing 
subsidy attributable to implicit government support for systemically important institutions that 
are considered “too-big-too-fail” (TBTF). Given the case for a bank leverage tax to serve these 
two roles, the case for taxation of returns to risk taking in the financial sector appears weaker.  
But its design features highlight the fact that an excise tax intended to alter the structure of bonus 
and performance-based compensation can fill a gap in prudential regulatory regimes. It is not 
clear, however, that this tax instrument should be preferred over a regulatory response.
12
  
                                                 
10
 Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis is articulated most completely in HYMAN P. MINSKY, 
STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986) [hereinafter MINSKY, STABILIZING (1986)]. With 
the first edition out of print, recent interest in Minsky’s ideas led to publication of a second edition, 
posthumously, under the guidance of Dimitri B. Papadimitriou and L. Randall Wray, two former colleagues 
of Minsky’s at the Levy Economics Institute. See HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE 
ECONOMY (McGraw Hill Prof’l, 2d ed. 2008) [hereinafter MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008)]. 
11
 See Paul Woolley, Why Are Financial Markets So Inefficient and Exploitative – And a Suggested 
Remedy, in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE: THE LSE REPORT 105 (2010). See also Dimitri Vayanos & 
Paul Woolley, An Institutional Theory of Momentum and Reversal (AFA 1020 Atlanta Meetings Paper, 
Aug.  2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1305671. 
12
 See e.g., Martin Wolf, Why and How Should We Regulate Pay in the Financial Sector? in THE 
FUTURE OF FINANCE, supra note 11, 227. 
 6 
II. THE SOCIAL PURPOSE OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR AND LEVERAGE 
AS AN INSTRUMENT OF EVIL: MINSKY’S FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
HYPOTHESIS 
The social purpose of the financial sector, which Lloyd Blankfein infamously referred to 
as “God’s work,” is conventionally categorized in terms of the following general functions:
13
 
 the provision of payment services; 
 the provision of insurance in the form of risk pooling; 
 the making of markets in assets, both spot and forward; and 
 the intermediation of funds between providers (that is, savers and investors) and users 
(that is, all borrowers and businesses raising equity capital). 
Financial instability tends to arise from a combination of asset mispricing and the use of leverage 
by the financial sector in performing the functions within the third and fourth categories, with the 
latter extending to the provision of maturity and risk/return transformation. Used in moderation, 
leverage is an instrument of good in performing these necessary functions. Used excessively, 
leverage is an instrument of evil as it fuels asset price increases through a price bubble. The 
inevitable price correction can “blow a hole” in the balance sheet of financial institutions and, in 
the extreme, can result in a financial crisis.  
The instability-breeding dynamics associated with the combination of asset mispricing 
and leverage is described by Hyman Minsky’s “financial instability hypothesis.”
14
 At the macro 
level, Minsky illustrates how aggregate profits for each period equal aggregate investment and 
depend on aggregate spending on investment.
15
 At a micro level, he argues that firms must be 
                                                 
13
 See Adair Turner, What Do Banks Do? Why Do Credit Booms and Busts Occur? What Can Public Policy 
Do About It? in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE, supra note 11, 3, 8. 
14
 Hyman P. Minsky, The Financial Instability Hypothesis 1, 6 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper 
No. 74, 1992) [hereinafter Minsky, Instability] (financial instability hypothesis is a theory of “… the impact 
of debt on system behavior and also incorporates the manner in which debt is validated.”). 
15
 MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 10, at 157-90. The aggregate amount of profits equals the 
sum of investment plus consumption out of profits plus the government’s deficit and any trade surplus, less 
savings out of wages. In a simplified model without government deficits, balanced trade, and no savings out 
of wages, profits equal investment (plus consumption by capitalists, which is negligible). See e.g., Elisabetta 
De Antoni, The (too?) Optimistic ‘Financial Keynesianism’ of Hyman Minsky 5-13 (2005), available at 
 7 
able to realize a markup over labor costs and will pursue market power to do so. Prices, 
therefore, have five discrete functions:
16
 
 to ensure that a surplus is generated; 
 to ensure that some of the surplus accrues to business owners; 
 to ensure that the demand price of capital assets is consistent with the supply price; 
 to ensure that debt finance commitments can be satisfied; and 
 to ensure that resources are allocated to the investment sector. 
In a capitalist economy, these functions are discharged in the form of two sets of prices: 
one for current output and one for capital assets.
17
 The price of current output depends on short-
run expectations of demand and wage rates. Spending on investment depends on the demand 
price and the supply price of capital assets.  The latter is a function of the costs of production, 
which consist primarily of purchase price (costs of labor plus a markup) and financing costs. The 
former is a function of expectations about future profits.  
Investment thereby links the price of capital assets with the price of current production. 
But the uncertainty associated with expectations of future profits and the financing of capital 
assets with debt makes the economy unstable. Expectations of profits depend on future 
investment, with realized profits determined by investment. Financial institutions are the critical 
actors in this process; they receive savings from households which are provided to businesses for 
production, with a reverse flow of funds moving from businesses to households. The flow of 
money to businesses occurs as a response to expectations of future profits, while the flow of 
money from businesses is financed by realized profits. Expectations of profits determine the flow 
of financing contracts to businesses and the value of those contracts, with the past, present, and 
future linked by these financial relations. Minsky’s description of financial relations is not 
                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.ius.unicas.it/mc2005/papers/deantoni.pdf ; see also Dimitri B. Papadimitriou & L. Randall 
Wray, Minsky’s Analysis of Financial Capitalism 6-9 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 275, 
1999); Janelia Tse, Minsky’s Financial Instability Hypothesis, 4 OECONOMICUS 77, 79-80 (2001). 
16
 MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 10, at 157-90. See also Tse, supra note 15, at 79. 
17
 Tse, supra note 15, at 80. 
 8 
limited, however, to businesses; it extends to households and governments by way of their ability 
to borrow on the basis of expectations of future cash flows.
18
 
These essential features of Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis are captured in his 
two theorems. The first theorem holds that the character of the financial relations predominating 
at any time in an economy determines its financial stability.
19
 In this respect, Minsky describes 
three states of financial relations characteristic of economic units: hedge finance, speculative 
finance, and Ponzi finance. A hedge finance unit is characterized by an ability to fulfill payment 
commitments with realized cash flows. Because equity finance provides a margin of safety in the 
event that realized profits are less than payment commitments under debt contracts, economic 
units with greater weighted levels of such finance will tend to be hedge finance units. A 
speculative finance unit is one that can meet its interest and similar income account commitments 
as they fall due, but cannot repay the amount of its principal repayment obligations and must roll 
over or refinance its liabilities on maturity. A Ponzi finance unit is one that cannot fulfill its 
obligations to pay interest or principal as they become due and must borrow against rising asset 
prices or sell assets to meet these commitments.  
Minsky’s second theorem holds that capitalist economies tend to move from a financial 
structure dominated by hedge finance to a structure dominated by speculative and Ponzi finance 
during periods of prolonged prosperity.
20
 The transition occurs as realized profits continue to 
validate debt, which increases expectations of future profit levels and investment financed by 
                                                 
18
 Minsky’s leverage story extends to an open-economy setting when businesses, households, and 
governments borrow internationally. Minsky, Instability, supra note 14, at 4-5. See also Philip Arestis & 
Murray Glickman, Financial Crisis in Southeast Asia: Dispelling Illusion the Minskyan Way, 26 
CAMBRIDGE. J. ECON. 237 (2002) (arguing that the sources of instability identified by Minsky are 
intensified in an open-economy setting); Jan Kregel, Managing the Impact of Volatility in International 
Capital Markets in an Uncertain World 4 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper No. 558, 2009) 
(describing the transmission of financial instability through international capital flows and risk-management 
techniques of multinational banks). 
19
 Minsky, Instability, supra note 14, at 7-8. 
20
 Ibid. Much the same process is described by John Geanakoplos as the “leverage cycle.” See e.g., John 
Geanakoplos, The Leverage Cycle 2 (Cowles Found. for Research in Econ., Discussion Paper No. 1715, 
July 2009), available at http://www.cowles.econ.yale.edu/.  
 9 
greater levels of debt.
21
 Financial institutions are supposed to function as skeptics and dampen 
the excessive enthusiasm, so that realized profits are more likely to be sufficient to fulfill 
commitments. But as Minsky emphasizes, financial institutions are profit-seeking enterprises that 
innovate in their acquisition of assets and marketing of liabilities as “merchants of debt”
22
 and, in 
the process, tend to fuel the transition to speculative and Ponzi finance during periods of 
prolonged prosperity. An ostensibly stable economy is essentially destabilized by its tranquility, 
as past success leads to expanding credit and the assumption of riskier positions.
 23
 The inevitable 
asset price correction can precipitate a “Minsky moment”
 24
 characterized by the ensuing debt 
deflation as financial institutions call in debts and tighten the provision of new credit, while 
borrowers, which include financial institutions, must sell assets to fulfill payment 
commitments.
25
 In the extreme, hedge finance units become speculative units; speculative units 
become Ponzi units; and Ponzi units see their net wealth disappear.  
                                                 
21
 This process is famously captured by the label “irrational exuberance,” which was used by Alan 
Greenspan, when he was chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank in testimony before Congress, to describe 
the stock market bubble in the mid-1990s. The label was arguably made that much more famous when 
Robert Shiller subsequently used it as the title of his book describing the same asset price bubble. See 
ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXHUBERANCE 3 (1
st
 ed., 2000). 
22
 Minsky, Instability, supra note 14, at 6 (“… thus, bankers … are merchants of debt who strive to innovate 
in the assets they acquire and the liabilities they market.”). 
23
 See CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT 
CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); See also Jaime Caruana, Gen. Manager, Bank for Int’l 
Settlements (BIS), The International Policy Responses to Financial Crises: Making the Macroprudential 
Approach Operational - Panel Remarks at Jackson Hole (Aug. 21-22, 2009), available at 
http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp090911.htm (emphasizing the feedback effects of credit extension, leverage, 
risk perceptions and risk appetite, asset prices, and economic activity which together can make the financial 
system more complex and characterized by nonlinear dynamics); Geanakoplos, supra note 20, at 16 
(emphasizing the significance of reductions in collateral requirements during periods of prosperity which 
are then increased in a debt deflationary environment).  
24
 Minksy never used the term “Minsky moment” to describe the downward shift in a business cycle with 
the ensuing necessity to sell assets to meet payment commitments. The term was apparently coined by a 
bond fund director, Paul McCulley, during the Russian debt crisis. See Justin Lahart, In Time of Tumult, 
Obscure Economist Gains Currency, WALL ST. J., Aug. 18, 2007. 
25
 See e.g., E. Philip Davis & Mark R. Stone, Corporate Financial Structure and Financial Stability, 1 J. 
FIN. STABILITY 65 (2004) (finding that the debt-equity ratios of firms are correlated with investment and 
inventory declines following crises). The process of debt deflation was first described by Irving Fisher, The 
Debt Deflation Theory of Great Depressions, 1 ECONOMETRICA 337 (1933). 
 10 
Minsky’s principal point of departure with neo-classical economic theory is the fact that 
he takes seriously the financial intermediation function, which he refers to generically as 
“banking.”
26
 The dynamics of the financing function, which are described by Minsky as the 
source of financial instability, do not depend on a premise of irrationality on the part of investors 
along any behavioral margin.
27
 Minsky’s challenge to neoclassical orthodoxy can be 
characterized, therefore, as a fundamental one distinguishing the market for consumer goods and 
services from the market for financial assets. The pricing mechanism of the former operates to 
allocate resources. Increased demand for an item triggers an increase in supply and vice versa, 
with changes in price equating demand and supply such that markets clear. Because of this 
process, the market for consumer goods and services is equilibrium seeking and vulnerable only 
to external shocks. The market for financial assets is much different in that it is characterized by 
the search for scarcity value in an environment in which supply does not respond completely to 
changes in price.
28
 An increase in price can stimulate increased demand without a corresponding 
increase in supply, while a decrease in price can cause a decrease in demand without a 
contraction of supply. In this type of market, it is the rate of price change that affects demand 
rather than price change itself.
29
 Such a market is not equilibrium seeking, but is inherently 
unstable and, in the presence of excessive leverage, it is fragile. 
                                                 
26
 MINSKY, STABILIZING (2008), supra note 10, at 173 (“In today’s standard economic theory, an 
abstract non-financial economy is analyzed. Theorems about this abstract economy are assumed to be 
essentially valid for economies with complex financial and monetary institutions and usages. This logical 
jump is an act of faith ...”). See also Papadimitriou & Wray, supra note 15, at 4-6 (describing the 
assumptions underlying the orthodox microeconomic and macroeconomic models criticized by Minsky). 
27
 See Geanakoplos, supra note 20, at 3 (“But a crucial part of my leverage cycle story is that every agent is 
acting perfectly rationally from his own individual point of view.”).  
28
 GEORGE COOPER, THE ORIGIN OF FINANCIALCRISES: CENTRAL BANKS, CREDIT 
BUBBLES AND THE EFFICIENT MARKET FALLACY 7-8 (2008). But see RICHARD 
BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE 
PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 213-220 (2007) (emphasizing demand and supply of liquidity as 
the principal driver of price movements rather than the revelation of information). 
29
 Cooper, supra note 28, at 8. See also Jack Treynor, Bulls, Bears, and Market Bubbles, 54 FIN. 
ANALYSTS  J. 69 (1998) (arguing that investors’ different views mean that there are winners and losers as 
prices change in response to new information, with the resulting wealth effect creating a new equilibrium 
and wealth shift that can cause greater subsequent price changes). 
 11 
Descriptively at least, Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis captures the instability-
breeding dynamics evident in financial crises; however, an observed shortcoming of Minsky’s 
story is a failure to posit a micro foundation that can explain the source of asset mispricing that, 
when combined with leverage, lies at the heart of financial instability. As described in the next 
part, an agency explanation of asset mispricing, focused on the financial intermediation function, 
can be seen to fill this gap 
III. AN AGENCY THEORY OF ASSET MISPRICING, RENT EXTRACTION 
AND WINNER-TAKE-ALL FEATURES OF THE LABOR MARKET IN THE 
FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The build up to the financial crisis of 2007-2009 was marked by two prominent features. 
One is the increasingly disproportionate size of the financial sector relative to the rest of the 
economy, particularly in the United Kingdom and the United States.
30
 The other is the 
increasingly disproportionate levels of compensation in the financial sector labor market as 
compared to the labor market generally.
31
 This outsized growth was not necessarily accompanied 
by a proportionate increase in the value added delivered by the financial sector.
32
 Indeed, much 
                                                 
30
 See Turner, supra note 13, at 13-30 (describing various dimensions indicative of the increased scale of 
operations of the financial sector relative to the rest of the economy occurring over the thirty to forty years 
preceding the financial crisis). 
31
 See e.g., Thomas Philippon & Ariell Reshef, Wages and Human Capital in the U.S. Financial Industry 
1909-2006 (NBER Working Paper No. 14644, January 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1329262 (finding that compensation in the financial sector was excessively high 
around 1930 and from the mid-1990s until 2006). 
32
 See Andrew Haldane, Simon Brennan & Vasileios Madouros, What Is the Contribution of the Financial 
Sector: Miracle or Mirage? in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE, supra note 11, 64 (finding that a detailed 
decomposition of returns to banking suggest that much of the increase in measured GDP contribution of the 
financial sector reflected returns to higher risk taking). See also Thomas Philippon, Has the U.S. Finance 
Industry Become Less Efficient? (NYU Working Paper No. FIN-11-037, November 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1972808 (finding that: (i) improvements in information technologies of the past 30 
years have not resulted in a decrease in the annual unit cost of financial intermediation which has remained 
stable over time at around 2 percent of outstanding assets, and (ii) financial services are produced under 
constant returns to scale); Jennie Bai, Thomas Philippon & Alex Savov, Have Financial Markets Become 
More Informative? available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2023889 (finding that the information content of 
market prices for equities and bonds in the United States has not increased despite increased trading 
activity); Turner, supra note 13, at 30-40 (suggesting that the value added by credit intermediation depends 
on the social function of different categories of credit intermediation while the provision of liquidity to asset 
markets through position taking is valuable up to a point but not beyond). 
 12 
of the growth may be attributable to increasingly destructive rent-seeking behavior
33
 which Paul 
Woolley argues is the source of the inherent instability described by Minsky.
34
  
Woolley’s critical premise is that asset prices are set, not by end investors or the 
representative household, but rather by their agents in the financial sector (banks, fund managers, 
and broker-dealers). This premise sets up a standard agency problem of information asymmetry 
in which the agents have more and better information than their principals while having 
divergent interests. Because of the information asymmetry, principals cannot distinguish 
competent and diligent agents from incompetent and shirking agents as determined against 
performance benchmarks.  In particular, principals cannot determine whether underperformance 
is attributable to incompetence or the prudent avoidance of overpriced assets. When 
underperformance persists, principals shift their funds to outperforming agents which generates 
and reinforces price momentum. In this respect, Woolley’s agency story is the mechanism by 




Woolley also argues that his agency story explains the extraction of progressively higher 
rents by the financial sector. What is important here is the recognition that information 
                                                 
33
 See e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE 
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS, 49 (Mar. 2009), available at 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/Library/Corporate/turner/index.shtml (suggesting that much of the structuring 
and trading activities involved in securitized credit was not required to deliver credit intermediation 
efficiently, but instead achieved rent extraction made possible by (i) the opacity of margins, (ii) the 
asymmetry of information and knowledge between end users of financial services and producers, and (iii) 
the structure of principal-agent relationships between investors and companies and between companies and 
individual employees); see also Philippon & Reshef, supra note 31 (estimating that rent extraction 
accounted for 30-50 percent of the wage differential between the financial sector and the rest of the 
economy observed over the ten years preceding the financial crisis). 
34
 Woolley, supra note 11; Vayanos & Woolley, supra note 11.  
35
 Woolley, supra note 11, at 111. See also Franklin Allen & Douglas Gale, Bubbles and Crises, 110 
ECON. J. 236 (2000) (constructing a simple model in which agency problems associated with leveraged 
investment in risky assets cause those assets to be priced above their fundamental value in the context of a 
credit expansion); RAGHURAM G. RAJAN, FAULT LINES: HOW HIDDEN FRACTURES STILL 
THREATEN THE WORLD ECONOMY 122 (2010) [hereinafter RAJAN, FAULT LINES] (observing that 
banker behavior tends to be self-reinforcing and can exaggerate investment trends, moving prices far away 
from fundamentals). 
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asymmetries explain the increasing, yet ultimately unsustainable, size of rents. Such rents are 
contrasted with the usual form of sustainable rents commonly attributed to exploitation of market 
power. This proposition is presented in a formal dynamic rational expectations model showing 
the evolution of a financial innovation.
36
 The key features of the model are uncertainty, learning, 
and information asymmetry which together generate initial growth, followed by the extraction of 
progressively higher rents and fat tails in the distribution of aggregate defaults and endogenous 
crisis. Agents must distinguish between robust and fragile financial innovations. Default risk 
with the former is low while default risk with the latter is high. In the presence of uncertainty, 
agents learn progressively about an innovation by observing profits derived from its adoption. 
High profits result in increased adoption and confidence that an innovation is, in fact, robust. 
Provided that information is symmetric for principals and agents, an increase in the scale of 
adoption of an innovation leads to increased compensation for agents; however, gains are 
competitively determined at normal levels (that is, an absence of rents), and a robust innovation 
flourishes. On the other hand, fragility leads to deteriorating profits, and an innovation is 
abandoned. Crises do not occur. 
In the presence of information asymmetries, agents have an incentive to shirk in their 
assessment of an innovation as fragile or robust which is exacerbated by payoff profiles that 
allow agents to share in gains but avoid losses. Principals must reward agents to address shirking 
but at the cost of the greater moral hazard associated with the resultant payoff profiles that result 
in progressively higher rent extraction. Woolley’s model shows that the probability of shirking is 
higher when an innovation is robust. After a period of consistently high profits, agents become 
increasingly confident that an innovation is robust, and the incentive to shirk increases such that 
principals must pay more to induce effort while agents increasingly capture most of the gains. An 
otherwise robust innovation ultimately collapses as principals become frustrated with 
increasingly poor returns. Alternatively, the fragility of an innovation is revealed in the presence 
of asset mispricing, and an otherwise fragile innovation similarly collapses. Principal-agent 
information asymmetry is thus posited as “responsible for creating the twin social bads of 
                                                 
36
 See Bruno Blais, Jean-Charles Rochet & Paul Woolley, Innovations, Rents and Risk (DNB Working 
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mispricing and rent capture.”
37
 Mispricing causes price swings that are at the heart of financial 
instability. Rent capture causes the misallocation of labor and capital, with significant wealth 




 Increasing levels of rent capture and increasing susceptibility to crisis are the two 
principal predictions of Woolley’s agency story that he claims are consistent with the empirical 
evidence.
39
 He fails to incorporate, however, the possible sources for the innovation that is 
posited as the driver of his agency theory of asset mispricing and rent capture that, because of 
standard problems of opacity and moral hazard, destabilize the economy through the financial 
sector. In this respect, explanatory power may be found in the observation that the labor market 
in the financial sector has, in the past several decades, come to exhibit features characteristic of 
what Robert Frank and Philip Cook characterize as “winner-take-all markets.” As Frank and 
Cook describe in their popular book, The Winner-Take-All Society,
40
 these kinds of labor markets 
are characterized by the determination of payoffs by relative rather than (or in addition to) 
absolute performance;
41
 another feature is that rewards tend to be captured by a small proportion 
of individuals. Small differences in abilities end up being associated with disproportionate 
differences in compensation levels.
42
  
Frank and Cook divide winner-take-all labor markets into two types: one type they label 
“mass markets” in which disproportionate rewards are available because a multitude of buyers 
each have a small interest in the winner’s performance.
43
 The other type of winner-take-all 
                                                                                                                                                 
Paper  No. 356, Oct. 2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2171740.  
37
 Woolley, supra note 11, at 117. 
38
 Ibid. (arguing that mispricing and rent capture create “a perfect storm of wealth destruction”). 
39
 Ibid, 115-116 citing Philippon & Resheff, supra note 31. 
40
 ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY: WHY THE FEW 
AT THE TOP GET SO MUCH MORE THAN THE REST OF US (1995). 
41




 Ibid, at 26. (citing as examples the markets for athletes and entertainers). 
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market is labelled “deep pocket markets” in which disproportionate rewards are available 
because a small number of buyers are intensely interested in the winner’s performance.
44
 The 
pattern of rewards characteristic of a winner-take-all labor market arguably tends to appear in the 
financial sector as a deep-pocket market associated most strongly with investment banking, asset 
management and securitization.
45
 Although Frank and Cook identify various sources of winner-
take all markets and factors driving the growth of such markets,
46
 four stand out as features of the 
labor market in the financial sector:  
 technological innovation; 
 deregulation;  
 decision leverage; and 
 wealth concentration.  
The adoption by the financial sector of sophisticated risk-management strategies is a 
familiar story
47
 that coincided with a movement to lighter regulation of the regulated part of the 
financial sector and a movement into unregulated shadow banks, securitization structures, hedge 
funds and private equity. These two trends fueled competition for talent that included an exodus 
of engineers, physicists, mathematicians, and business school graduates to the financial sector.
48
  
                                                 
44
 Ibid. (citing as examples the markets for painters, sculptors, and lawyers. 
45
 See RAJAN, FAULT LINES, supra note 35, at 123-129 (emphasizing use of money to measure 
performance in the financial sector and the lack of any other factor as a measure of worth). 
46
 FRANK & COOK, supra note 40, at 32-44, 45-60. 
47
 For accessible and entertaining accounts of the development of financial theory, see PETER L. 
BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS: THE IMPROBABLE ORIGINS OF MODERN WALL STREET 
(1992); PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK 
(1996); PETER L. BERNSTEIN, CAPITAL IDEAS EVOLVING (2007). 
48
 See Philippon & Reshef, supra note 31 (finding that financial deregulation and corporate activities linked 
to initial public offerings (IPOs) and credit risk increased the demand for skills in financial jobs that were 
relatively skill intensive, complex and highly paid until the 1930s and after the 1980s, but not in the interim 
period). See also Joshua N. Ruah & Steven N. Kaplan, Wall Street and Main Street: What Contributes to 
the Rise in Highest Incomes? (NBER Working Paper No. 13270, July 2007) , available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=931280 (suggesting that theories of skill-biased technological change, superstars 
and greater scale explain the increased percentage representation of financial sector employees (from 
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The competition for talent to create and refine innovations provided labor below the executive 
level with decision leverage: that is, the ability to significantly affect the outcomes of an 
organization with decisions made by a particular employee. All of these factors can be seen in 
increasingly higher levels of compensation to successful traders in financial firms. Increasing 
levels of wealth concentration have also provided concentrated purchasing power seeking the 
best asset management talent often found in hedge funds and private equity firms that seamlessly 
compete for talent developed in investment banks.
49
 
These kinds of factors can be seen to have driven the genesis and growth of winner-take-
all labor markets in the financial sector which then adopted the standard payoff profiles seen in 
other winner-take-all labor markets. More particularly, performance as the basis of different 
levels of compensation can be readily measured; moreover, the gains from successful 
performance can be scaled: that is, non-linear returns can be generated from a given level of 
investment of human capital. The financial sector especially lends itself to scalable returns 
because of the limitless supply of financial products in response to demand. The financial sector 
thus became characterized by the chase for returns in excess of those provided by holding a 
benchmark market index that reflects systemic or “beta risk.” The value added provided by the 
asset manager (the agent in Woolley’s agency story) is seen to generate the excess return referred 
to as “alpha” for which investors will pay a premium. Woolley’s robust versus fragile 
innovations can be seen as strategies employed by asset managers to generate alpha.
 50
 As noted 
by Rajan,
51
 there are, however limited sources of alpha. One source is genuine abilities to 
                                                                                                                                                 
investment banks, hedge funds, private equity firms, and mutual funds) in the adjusted gross income 
categories at or above top 0.1 percent).  
49
 See e.g., RAJAN, FAULT LINES, supra note 35, at 132 (“….. there are enormous risks in bringing 
together deep-pocketed investors who are not adequately conscious of prices and risks, and the highly 
motivated private financial sector.”). 
50
 See e.g., PHILIP AUGAR, CHASING ALPHA: HOW RECKLESS GROWTH AND UNCHECKED 
AMBITION RUINED THE CITY’S GOLDEN DECADE (2009). 
51
 RAGHURAM RAJAN, Bankers’ Pay Is Deeply Flawed, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 9, 2008 [hereinafter 
Rajan, Bankers’ Pay]. See also RAJAN, FAULT LINES, supra note 35, at 134-53; Gian Luca Clementi, 
Thomas F. Cooley, Matthew Richardson & Ingo Walter, Rethinking Compensation in Financial Firms, in 
RESTORING FINANCIAL STABILITY: HOW TO REPAIR A FAILED SYSTEM 187, 203-206 (Viral 
V. Acharya & Matthew Richardson eds., 2009).  
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consistently identify underpriced assets as a “value-investing” strategy, but agents/asset 
managers with these abilities are rare. Another source is from activist investment commonly 
associated with venture capital and private equity funds that acquire a controlling interest and 
manage assets in a more effective manner. A third source is the financial innovation identified by 
Woolley in creating cash flows and associated securities that are new and thereby complete 
markets by providing investors with novel payoff profiles. 
Rajan emphasizes that generating sustainable alpha is difficult because of the 
requirement of special abilities and constant innovation.
52
 “False alpha” arises in the form of 
what appear to be excess returns associated with a steady stream of payoffs that can be reversed 
on the occurrence of a “tail risk” event resulting in a rare but disproportionate negative return. 
Given limited liability in the event of loss, the financial sector can engage in the chase for false 
alpha by adopting asymmetric bets using leverage that has manifested itself in a series of 
financial crises from the 1980s, culminating in the crisis of 2007-2009 centered in the US 
mortgage market. As the latest crisis revealed, sustainable and genuine alpha can be measured 
only in the long term, with false alpha arising in the short to medium term. This fact is significant 
for the structuring of compensation in the financial sector
53
 and, as emphasized in the next part, a 
line of argumentation that borrows loosely from the conceptual foundations of corrective 
taxation can support an excise tax on bonus and performance-based compensation, as well as a 
bank leverage tax, as instruments intended to suppress the instability-breeding dynamics of 
financial markets. 
                                                 
52




IV. CORRECTIVE TAXATION AND THE POLICY CASE FOR SPECIAL TAXES 
ON THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The post-crisis tax literature tends to emphasize the following justifications for special 
taxes on the financial sector:
54
 
 as a corrective tax intended to impose a marginal cost on the financial sector equal to the 
marginal social harm attributable to excessive risk taking; 
 as a risk-based charge intended to function as an insurance levy; or 
 as a revenue source intended to require the financial sector to pay for some portion of the 
costs of bailouts. 
It is argued in this part that the first and second justifications are problematic: the first 
because of redundancy with prudential regulatory regimes; and the second because of costing 
issues. Nonetheless, a bank leverage tax, which has been adopted by a number of countries post 
crisis, can be justified as an instrument to both require the financial sector to pay the direct fiscal 
costs of bailouts and eliminate the TBTF borrowing subsidy. A decidedly secondary, but 
desirable, effect of this tax base is a possible reduction of risk taking associated with a reduction 
of leverage attributable to a tax-price increase. As proposed in some of the tax literature,
 55
 the 
case for adoption of standard measures of returns to risk-taking in the context of income and 
consumption tax bases as the base for a special tax on the financial sector must be grounded 
primarily on the third justification noted above. Any behavioral response to this tax base is likely 
weak, particularly as compared to a bank leverage tax. An excise tax on bonus and performance-
based compensation in the financial sector can be justified as a policy instrument intended to 
alter the structure of such compensation and associated risk taking, but is redundant where 
regulatory regimes impose requirements with similar intended effects. In that case, this tax base 
must also be justified on the third basis noted above. 
                                                 
54
 See e.g., IMF Staff, A Fair and Substantial Contribution, supra note 5; Keen, supra note 8. See also 
Devereux, supra note 8, at 13-23 (distinguishing between taxes on the financial sector that are intended to 
raise revenue and those same taxes that are intended to influence behavior). 
55
 See IMF Staff, A Fair and Substantial Contribution, supra note 5, at 19 (noting that a “financial activities 
tax” (FAT) could raise significant revenue and be designed to serve a range of purposes). 
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A. Prudential Regulation as the Policy Instrument of Choice Intended to Moderate 
Financial Instability 
Parts two and three described the destabilizing effect of the use of leverage combined 
with asset mispricing in the financial sector, as well as the winner-take-all features of the labor 
market in this sector that can amplify both in the context of a standard principal-agent problem. 
Such instability, which is endogenous to the financial sector and thus sophisticated capitalist 
economies reliant on a robust financial function, requires a regulatory response in the presence of 
social costs imposed by the insolvency of financial institutions. The case for regulation is thus a 
standard one that requires government intervention in the market whenever particular activities in 
production or consumption impose costs on third parties (referred to as “negative spillovers” or 
negative externalities”). Even in the presence of asset mispricing, no such externalities would 
arise if all financial institutions were entirely equity-financed in performing their necessary 
functions, or if equity holders had unlimited liability and sufficient assets to satisfy the liabilities 
of their leveraged firms. Under those conditions, all costs of insolvency would be internalized as 
private marginal costs of the equity holders.
56
 But as capitalist economies have grown and 
become more sophisticated, these conditions have been seen to be excessively constraining on 
performance of the financial sector’s functions.  
Limited liability of equity holders means that the combination of leverage and asset 
mispricing are destabilizing with consequent social costs of insolvency.
57
As described by 
Goodhart,
58
 there are five separate sets of such costs: 
 direct costs of the use of resources to wind up a firm; 
 potential dislocation of financial markets and settlement/payment systems; 
                                                 
56
 See Charles Goodhart, How Should We Regulate the Financial Sector? in THE FUTURE OF FINANCE, 
supra note 11, 153, 159. 
57
 See IMF, Debt Bias and other Distortions: Crisis-Related Issues in Tax Policy, 12 (June 12, 2009), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2009/061209.pdf , [hereinafter IMF, Crisis-Related 
Issues] (characterizing excessive leverage as a negative externality that is not captured by micro-economic 
models focused on the level of firm-specific borrowing as a function of the internalization of bankruptcy 
costs). 
58
 Goodhart, supra note 56, at 158. 
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 loss of specialized skills/information of employees of the firm; 
 uncertainty and potential loss for all counterparties of the firm; and 
 loss of unused credit facilities with loss of potential access to money. 
In the event of a crisis precipitated by the contemporaneous failure of multiple institutions,
59
 
social costs extend to include:
60
 (i) deadweight losses from fiscal transfers; and (ii) output losses, 
including increases in unemployment. 
The most significant location of instability with the largest potential social costs is the 
performance of the credit intermediation function, primarily in the form of:
61
 (i) maturity 
transformation in which financial institutions lend funds at longer average maturities than they 
borrow funds; and (ii) risk-return transformation using the liabilities of borrowers to create a 
different mix of debt and equity investment options for savers. Although instability can also be 
associated with the market-making function,
62
 it tends to be more prominent and threatening in 
the case of maturity and risk-return transformation because the dominant portion of the assets 
and liabilities of large and systemically important financial institutions are devoted to these 
functions. As a result, “the hole in the balance sheet” that can occur because of an asset price 
correction can be especially severe. The standard pattern of prudential regulation intended to 
maintain firm and sector-wide stability focuses on the performance of these functions. Indeed, a 
prominent feature of the latest financial crisis was the fact that it was precipitated by problems in 
traditional investment banks that were essentially performing the maturity and risk-return 
                                                 
59
 See GARY B. GORTON, MISUNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISES: WHY WE DON’T SEE 
THEM COMING 171 (2012) (citing Gerard Caprio & Daniela Klingebiel, Bank Insolvencies: Cross 
Country Experience 1-2 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1620, 1996), available at 
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet.../WDSP/IB/1996/.../multi_page.pdf for a definition of a financial 
crisis as the exhaustion of the entire capital of the banking system or evidence of significant problems in the 
banking system). 
60
 GORTON, supra note 59, at 171. 
61
 Turner, supra note 13, at 9-11. 
62
 Ibid, at 59 (observing that losses incurred in trading activities can generate confidence collapses which 
can constrain credit supply and necessitate public rescue in extreme cases). 
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transformation function through securitization of subprime mortgages, but were not formally 
within the regulatory regime applicable to this function.
63
 
At a general level, prudential regulatory regimes attempt to moderate instability by 
requiring minimum liquidity and equity capital requirements as constraints on leverage in the 
event the value of assets is impaired. Constraints on activities can also be used to ensure some 
stability of asset value. In the wake of the financial crisis, there has been a concerted focus by 
policymakers, as well as in the academic literature, on reform of prudential regulatory regimes. 
Not surprisingly, the more radical reform proposals, in the sense that they are focused on 
structural reform of regulatory regimes, are found in the policy literature.
64
 As Turner argues,
 65
 
however, a significant problem shared by these proposals is their inability to adequately address 
the underlying causes of financial instability centred on asset mispricing and leverage while also 
sufficiently allowing for the provision of valuable maturity and risk-transformation functions 
demanded by households and businesses. He emphasizes that the challenge for policymakers 
remains striking a suitable balance between constraining the sources of financial instability while 
allowing the provision of valuable credit intermediation providing maturity and risk 
transformation.
66
 In this respect, the focus of policymakers has been, not radical structural 
reform,
 67
 but incremental reforms of existing regulatory structures, including increased levels of 
                                                 
63
 Ibid, (highlighting the combination of credit intermediation and the trading function performed by 
investment banks securitizing subprime mortgages as the source of the financial crisis). 
64
 See e.g., LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, JIMMY STEWART IS DEAD: ENDING THE WORLD’S 
ONGOING FINANCIAL PLAGUE WITH LIMITED PURPOSE BANKING (2010) (proposing a system 
of mutual lending in which the credit intermediation function would be performed by mutual loan funds 
with investors sharing in returns as fund holders); JOHN KAY, NARROW BANKING: THE REFORM OF 
BANKING REGULATION (2009) (proposing a system of “narrow banking” which would involve removal 
of retail deposit taking from the credit intermediation function and provision of this function by financial 
firms competing in an unregulated market for uninsured wholesale funds). Another structural reform 
proposal for separation of commercial lending and proprietary trading is commonly associated with the 
former Federal Reserve Bank chairman, Paul Volcker. 
65
 Turner, supra note 13, at 58-61. 
66
 Ibid, at 61-62. 
67
 Of the structural reform proposals on offer, only “the Volcker rule” has been adopted. Dodd-Frank Wall 





 adoption or refinement of resolution regimes,
69




As an initial proposition, it is unclear what role corrective taxation can, or is supposed to, 
serve in supporting prudential regulation - either in its existing form or a radically reformed 
structure - as a policy instrument intended to provide a desirable level of resiliency in the 
financial sector. In the standard public finance analytical framework, prudential regulation is 
clearly the preferred policy instrument over corrective taxation understood in the sense of the 
attempt to force market participants to internalize the full costs of their activities in either 
production or consumption. The case for the use of a corrective tax is simply the observation 
that, under certain conditions, a corrective tax can induce a desired reduction in social costs 
attributable to an activity at the lowest private marginal cost for market participants.
71
 Some of 
the relevant conditions include the following:
72 
 the ability to quantify social marginal costs on a present-value basis in order to calibrate 
the amount of the corrective tax necessary to realize the desired reduction in the activity 
generating the costs; 
 the presence of different cost structures for market participants such that some market 
participants can avoid paying the tax by adopting lower cost methods of avoidance, while 
                                                 
68
 See e.g., Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More 
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems (June 2011); Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, An 
Assessment of the Long-Term Economic Impact of Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements (Aug. 
2010). But see Anat R. Admati, Peter M. DeMarzo, Martin F. Hellwig & Paul C. Pfleiderer, Fallacies, 
Facts, and Myths in the Discussion of Capital Regulation: Why Bank Equity is not Expensive (Rock Centre 
for Corporate Governance at Stanford University Working Paper No. 86, Mar. 23, 2011), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1669704 (arguing that bank equity is not socially expensive and significantly 
higher equity requirements should be imposed).  
69
 See e.g., IMF, A Fair and Substantial Contribution, supra note 5, at 7-8. 
70
 See e.g., Paul Jenkins & Gordon Thiessen, Reducing the Potential for Future Financial Crises: A 
Framework for Macro-Prudential Policy in Canada (Toronto: CD Howe Institute, May 2012); Caruana, 
supra note 23; Tobias Adrian & Markus Brunnermeier, CoVAR (Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff 
Reports, No. 348, Aug. 27, 2009), available at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1269446. 
71
 The seminal paper modelling the choice between regulation and corrective taxation is Martin L. 
Weitzman, Prices Versus Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974). 
72
 See e.g., JONATHAN GRUBER, PUBLIC FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 134-146 (4th ed., 2012).  
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other market participants must pay the tax to the point that private marginal costs are 
equated with social marginal costs;  
 a linear relationship between an increase in the relevant activity and the imposition of 
additional social costs; and 
 the presence of social marginal costs that increase in modest incremental amounts with 
increases in the relevant activity. 
In performing its necessary functions, the financial sector arguably operates under none 
of these conditions. The social costs attributable to the insolvency of a financial firm are 
exceedingly difficult to quantify and virtually impossible to quantify in the event of a financial 
crisis involving multiple firm failures; at least in terms of the various subsectors of the financial 
sector performing different functions, the cost structures tend to be homogenous, with this 
pattern appearing in firms operating across different functions; the relationship between an 
increase in social marginal costs and risk-taking behavior by financial institutions is decidedly 
non-linear; at some point that is difficult to define with any precision, the level of risk-taking 
goes from the imposition of only potential social costs to the imposition of actual costs as an 
institution becomes insolvent,
73
 with this “cliff-effect” relationship resulting in the imposition of 
decidedly traumatic social costs in the event of a financial crisis with multiple failures.
74
  
Given that the financial sector operates under these conditions, the case for corrective 
taxation as the policy instrument of choice to moderate financial instability is problematic.
75
 
Moreover, the dominant position of prudential regulatory regimes means that, for all practical 
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 See e.g., Andrew Haldane, Regulation or Prohibition: The $100 Billion Question, 2 J. REG. & RISK - 
NORTH ASIA 101, 106-16 (2010) (reviewing major changes to regulatory regime in the United States and 
suggesting that regulation of the financial sector is preferable to corrective taxation because the social 
marginal cost curve is likely steeper than the private marginal cost curve). See also IMF, A Fair and 
Substantial Contribution, supra note 5, at 53 (observing that the nonlinear nature of financial stress 
suggests that hard limits on leverage and/or the prohibition of certain activities be used to moderate 
financial instability). 
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 See Keen, supra note 8, at 12-13 (observing that the expected social costs are a function of the 
probability of financial institution failure and the wider economic costs associated with such failure if 
unmitigated). 
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purposes, any debate over the choice of policy instrument is closed. Indeed, until the latest 
financial crisis, there really was no discussion in the public finance literature of the use of 
corrective taxes to moderate financial instability.
76
 But special taxes on the financial sector can 
have normative significance independent of prudential regulatory regimes, as well as the notion 
of a corrective tax as an attempt to quantify the social marginal harm attributable to excessive 
risk taking and impose a tax equal to that harm in an effort to equate private and social marginal 
costs. One possibility is the use of a tax instrument to fill a gap in prudential regulatory regimes 
or otherwise perform a supporting role by inducing a behavioral response that moderates 
financial instability. Another possibility is the raising of revenue from the financial sector to 
avoid the distributional consequences of the income transfer that occurs when government bails 
the sector out to avoid its liquidation. As suggested in the following section, it is somewhat 
unsurprising that bank leverage taxes have emerged as the dominant tax instrument framed in 
terms of these possible justifications.  
B. Bank Leverage Taxes and Taxation of Returns to Risk Taking 
There are arguably two different strands in the post-crisis tax literature using the concept 
of corrective taxation in a much looser sense of a tax intended to induce a desired behavioral 
response.  One strand of this post-crisis literature emphasizes the possible amplifying effects on 
the build up to the crisis of certain structural features of the income tax system, such as the 
inconsistent treatment of corporate debt and equity, the deduction of home mortgage interest, and 
a capital gains preference, as well as exempt treatment of financial services under value-added 
tax (VAT) systems.
77
 However, the lack of any empirical evidence of the relationship between 
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 But see Devereux, supra note 8, at 20 (emphasizing that a corrective tax can be imposed using a 
nonlinear schedule but it is necessary to divide the aggregate marginal benefit among banks to derive the 
appropriate schedule and it is difficult to implement a tax in which each bank faces a different tax rate ). 
76
 See Shackelford, Shaviro, & Slemrod, supra note 8 (emphasizing the difficulties in the design of Pigovian 
taxes as a means to address systemic risk in the financial sector). See also Keen, supra note 8, at 2-5 (noting 
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 See e.g., IMF, Crisis-Related Issues, supra note 57; Michael Keen, Alexander Klemm, & Victoria Perry, 
Tax and the Crisis, 31 FISCAL STUD. 43 (2010); see also Daniel Shaviro, Income Tax Reform 
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these structural features and the sources of financial instability
78
 means that the standard 
inefficiencies commonly associated with these features remain the principal policy imperative for 
reform; the crisis can be seen to have provided an opportunity to view them from a new 
perspective that, at best, can add to the case for reform.  
Another strand of the same literature emphasizes the revenue-raising capacity of special 
taxes on the financial sector as a means to fund the public costs of bailouts in the event of failure; 
as a secondary feature, these taxes are seen as instruments to induce a desired behavioral 
response in the form of a reduction in leverage attributable to an increase in its tax price. In 
effect, taxing debt of financial institutions can be seen to have the desirable secondary feature of 
offsetting a generalized income tax bias in favor of debt and, by reducing leverage levels, 
reducing associated risk taking.
79
 As noted already, a bank leverage tax applied to wholesale 
liabilities
80
 of financial institutions is the apparent instrument of choice for policymakers post 
crisis to realize both the revenue-raising and leverage-reduction goals.
81
 In extending the 
application of such a tax beyond retail deposit insurance, which is intended to limit the social 
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costs of liquidity crises in the form of bank runs,
82
 policymakers presumably recognize that 
prudential regulatory regimes are imperfect and cannot be expected to eliminate the occurrence 
of either individual institution or sector-wide insolvencies.
83
 In particular, a balance must be 
struck between ensuring complete stability of the financial sector and managing instability in 
order to allow the financial sector to deliver an adequate range of services that enhance welfare 
and facilitate economic growth. That balance may be defensibly shifted toward tighter regulation 
in the context of developed economies where the link to economic growth is not as clear as in 
developing economies, and there is therefore an element of financial activity that is wasteful.
84
 
Even then, however, an element of instability must be tolerated in order to avoid unduly 
constraining the financial sector in its performance of necessary functions. The simple notion is 
to accumulate a fund that can be used to absorb the public costs of rescue in the same manner as 
general insurance. In this sense, an insurance levy can be seen as an attempt to contain the public 
costs of rescue by forcing the financial sector to self-fund while supporting the prudential 
regulatory regime in the event of its failure.  
A bank leverage tax imposed on wholesale liabilities can be justified, therefore, as 
performing an insurance function, with leverage as the proxy for risk taking; it may also serve as 
a corrective tax in the sense used in the public finance literature if average and marginal social 
damage attributable to risk taking by financial institutions are equivalent.
85
 Any behavioral 
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response in the form of a reduction in the level of leverage of financial firms and associated 
instability is entirely incidental, however; the goal is to ensure that premiums and any investment 
income earned on the accumulated fund equal the expected benefit of payment on the occurrence 
of the insured event.
86
 Indeed, it is unclear what the extent of any behavioral response would be 
and to what extent it would be efficiency enhancing by moderating instability without unduly 
constraining financial activities that deliver value added.
87
 More importantly perhaps, a 
significant problem with the design of a bank leverage tax as an insurance levy is the 
determination of an actuarially appropriate levy at both the individual institution level and sector 
wide. With respect to the former, the amount of the levy can be determined most simply as a 
fixed percentage of wholesale liabilities as the specified base. But under this simplified 
approach, a segment of insureds with a lower risk profile subsidize those with a higher risk 
profile. The alternative is to calibrate the levy at the institution level to realize a separating 
equilibrium among insureds. This approach is exceedingly complex and requires, in particular, 
an assessment of the systemic importance of individual institutions.
88
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Moreover, it is not clear that determination of an actuarially appropriate levy at the level 
of individual institutions matters all that much when risk of failure is correlated among 
institutions, and the event requiring funding is multiple failures and the potential liquidation of 
the financial sector.
89
 In fact, the extension of retail deposit insurance through a bank leverage 
tax on wholesale liabilities is probably most clearly conceived as an insurance levy protecting 
against failure at the level of an individual financial institution in an environment in which risk 
of failure is uncorrelated among institutions, and policymakers can abstract from a necessary 
accounting for systemic risk. If the goal is instead the raising of sufficient revenue to avoid 
liquidation of the financial system, the revenue target must necessarily be limited to the direct 
fiscal costs of bailout: that is, the wealth transfer that would otherwise be made from taxpayers to 
the financial sector to avoid its liquidation.
90
 The magnitude of output losses attributable to a 
financial crisis would arguably require imposition of an insurance levy in an amount that would 
eliminate profits and would itself liquidate the financial sector.
91
 An alternative is to conceive of 
the insurance levy as intended to prevent bank runs by wholesale lenders similar to retail deposit 
insurance, but the magnitude of the exposure in the event of a sector-wide solvency crisis also 
makes the necessary premia for such coverage unrealistic.
92
 The general revenue-raising function 
of government is thus required to provide sufficient funding to address the full social costs of a 
financial crisis. 
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The modest rates at which bank leverage taxes have been enacted by many countries post 
crisis
93
 suggests that these taxes are seen as a means to require the financial sector to pay for the 
direct fiscal costs of bailouts either in advance or after-the-fact
94
 while, in the former case at 
least, suppressing, to some indeterminate extent, the use of leverage and associated risk taking. 
As emphasized in some of the post-crisis literature,
 95
 however, bank leverage taxes can also 
serve a much different role as a corrective tax. More particularly, the application of a bank 
leverage tax can be limited to TBTF institutions and applied at a rate that equals the borrowing 
subsidy attributable to implicit government support. This alternative framing is defensible as an 
attempt to eliminate the subsidy with an emphasis on the associated behavioral response that, in 
the loose sense used in some of the post-crisis literature, is a form of corrective taxation. In fact, 
this policy justification may be the closest form of corrective tax in the tighter sense of the term 
used in the public finance literature even though the amount of the subsidy,
96
 and the offsetting 
amount of the tax, does not equal the social damage attributable to additional financial activity 
because of the availability of cheap debt. The connection between the amount of the tax and the 
social damage is, instead, an indirect one with the elimination of the subsidy by the tax resulting 
in a reduction in social damage attributable to it. By setting the tax rate at an amount equal to the 
subsidy, government effectively collects a fee for provision of its implicit guarantee as 
established by the bond market and thereby increases private costs to an appropriate risk-adjusted 
market rate. The resulting reduction in financial services provided by TBTF institutions may 
have an impact on what might otherwise be considered excessive risk taking and complement 
prudential regulatory regimes in moderating financial instability; it should also help to address 
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distortions to competition and the possible over-supply of financial services by a bloated 
financial sector.  
Irrespective of the particular justification, bank leverage taxes present a number of 
second-order design issues, none of which would appear to be insurmountable.
97
 Determination 
of both the rate and the scope of a bank leverage tax intended to eliminate the TBTF subsidy is, 
admittedly, more problematic than it is when the tax is intended to recover expected direct fiscal 
costs of bailouts. Estimates of the amount of the subsidy and the rate required to eliminate it vary 
empirically.
98
 In terms of the scope of the tax, some form of asset-based test must be used as a 
proxy for TBTF status rather than applying it broadly to the financial sector on the premise that 
all institutions benefit from government intervention in the event of a crisis.
99
 Perhaps because of 
the different rate and scope features, there is a tendency to frame a bank leverage tax as either 
intended to cover the direct fiscal costs of bailouts or to eliminate the TBTF borrowing subsidy. 
However, it is relatively obvious that a bank leverage tax could be designed to realize both 
purposes. On the plausible empirical assumption that the rate required to eliminate the TBTF 
subsidy would be greater than the general rate payable by all financial institutions, TBTF 
institutions could be permitted to credit the amount of the tax payable at the higher rate against 
their general liability at the lower rate. 
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With adoption of a comprehensive bank leverage tax designed to recover the direct fiscal 
costs of bailouts as well as eliminate the TBTF borrowing subsidy, other tax bases would seem to 
be required, at least in terms of revenue generation, only if policymakers were inclined to require 
the financial sector to pay for the full social costs of bailouts and, in particular, consequent 
output losses.
100
 In that case, a bank leverage tax provides too narrow a base to generate the 
required revenue at a rate that would not otherwise force the financial sector into an all-equity 
mutual-lending structure advocated by Kotlikoff
101
 and thereby generate no revenue because of 
the prohibitive cost of debt. The revenue target is, however, ill-defined since, as already noted,
102
 
full compensation by the financial sector for output losses would require a tax or insurance levy 
of a magnitude that would itself liquidate the financial sector. As an instrument intended to 
compensate for expected output losses associated with financial crises, the justification for other 
possible bases thus moves away from the determination of an actuarially appropriate insurance 
levy or a tax intended to induce a behavioral response that moderates financial instability. The 
attempt is to require a contribution by the financial sector that goes beyond reimbursement of the 
inevitable income transfers in the event of a financial crisis, but can similarly be seen to have 
desirable distributional properties in the sense that the tax compensates, but only in part, for the 
social harm in the form of output losses. It is in this respect that taxation of returns to risk taking 




It is a well-known insight of the tax-policy literature that normal returns to capital can be 
exempted by imputing interest expense on equity and providing a deduction at the corporate level 
consistent with the treatment of debt while not taxing such returns to investors; moreover, risk 
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premia for the bearing of undiversifiable market risk (beta) can also be exempted by imputing 
interest expense on equity at an appropriate risk-adjusted rate. The tax base thus becomes 
supernormal or excess returns (alpha) to risk taking as well as economic rents attributable to 
market power. The standard rationale for the articulation of such a tax base is to equate the tax 
treatment of debt and equity while treating normal and risk-adjusted returns consistent with a 
consumption tax in order to avoid the deadweight loss attributable to the behavioral response in 
the presence of the taxation of these returns.
104
 Supernormal returns to risk taking remain taxable 
on the empirical assumption that there is no behavioral response in the presence of taxable 
treatment. The notion in the post-crisis literature, however, is to apply taxation of supernormal 
returns to risk taking exclusively in the financial sector as a tax base in addition to the income tax 
and the VAT;
 105
 although in the case of the latter, the additional tax base would provide a 
measure of taxation of value added by the financial sector in the aggregate at the firm level and 
can be seen as a substitute for exempt treatment of margin-based financial charges in the 
presence of a perceived inability to tax such charges under a transactional invoice/credit VAT. 
In terms of revenue-raising capacity, returns to risk taking and economic rents clearly 
provide a larger revenue base than a bank leverage tax,
106
 but at the cost of a weaker behavioral 
response that the tax-policy literature emphasizes as the principal attraction of a tax base limited 
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to supernormal or excess returns.
107
 Indeed, to the extent that this base is focused on supernormal 
or excess returns with a tax rate at something less than 100 percent, there will be no, or very 
little, behavioral response.
108
 The presence of sustainable alpha associated with unique abilities, 
or false alpha associated with asymmetric bets, will cause financial firms to pursue the relevant 
investment and business strategies providing these forms of returns to the extent there is a 
positive after-tax amount; moreover, the lack of any behavioral response at something less than a 
100 percent tax rate would likely persist even if loss recognition is denied.
109
 To induce a 
reduction in risk taking, returns to undiversifiable risk, as well as supernormal returns, could be 
taxed by imputing and exempting interest on equity at a riskless rate; yet the reduction in risk 
taking would be efficiency enhancing only to the extent that it suppresses superfluous financial 
activity, and there is no obvious way to distinguish such activity from the delivery of financial 
services that provide value added in support of economic growth.
110
 Taxation of risk premia 
associated with undiversifiable market risk would raise the cost of equity financing for financial 
firms and operate at cross-purposes with prudential regulatory regimes requiring maintenance of 
specified capital ratios. Given these probable behavioral properties and an imprecisely specified 
revenue target in the presence of a bank leverage tax, it is perhaps not surprising that taxation of 
returns to risk taking in the financial sector has not had any policy traction in practice.   
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C. An Excise Tax on Bonus and Performance-Based Compensation 
Taxation of returns to risk taking has tended to focus on these returns realized by equity 
investors, with the choice of interest imputation rate on equity determining the extent to which 
risk premia are taxed. The assumption underlying this focus is that rents are not earned by labor 
and all wages and salary are therefore deductible in computing the tax base. This assumption 
does not hold in the financial sector where, as described in part three, a substantial portion of 
rents are captured by labor. In this respect, it is again descriptively correct to observe that rents 
captured by labor in the financial sector, as well as rents captured by equity investors, can be 
taxed. This result can be realized relatively easily by denying a deduction for compensation in 
excess of a specified level.
111
 But as with taxation of rents captured by equity investors, there 
should be no behavioral response to the extent that rents captured by labor are taxed at something 
less than 100 percent. Nonetheless, taxation of these returns, in particular, can be designed to 
realize a sharp behavioral response provided the tax is focused on the structure of compensation 
in the financial sector and not the level of compensation. In effect, the tax can be designed to 
induce compensation structures that mimic the payoff profile of equity investors by ensuring that 
labor is exposed to loss of performance-based compensation in the same manner as equity 
investors are exposed to the loss of invested capital.  
One of the reform themes in the post-crisis legal and economic literature is the need to 
address the structure of bonus or performance-based compensation in the financial sector, which 
can be seen to have encouraged excessive risk taking in the form of placing asymmetric bets 
generating option-like payoffs that for some time appeared to be rents but that were revealed by 
the crisis to be false alpha. Two structural reform ideas can be indentified in this literature. One 
idea, advocated by Bebchuk and Spamann, would require an element of bonus or performance-
based compensation to be linked with the value of the interests of debt holders and fixed 
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participating equity holders (for example, preferred shareholders).
112
 This type of link would 
broadly align the incentives of labor with other stakeholders who do not benefit from option-like 
payoff profiles and thereby would suppress, to some extent at least, the incentive to otherwise 
place asymmetric bets with firm assets to the benefit of labor and fully-participating equity 
investors (common shareholders). The other reform idea, proposed most prominently in a report 
by a group of leading financial economists,
 113
 would attempt to realize the same goal, but instead 
by requiring that an element of bonus or performance-based compensation earned in a year be set 
aside and be subject to claw back in the event of loss occurring during a specified period.  
Both reforms would obviously require considerable thought as to second-order design 
details focused on, for example, the requisite weighting of the interests of stakeholders other than 
common shareholders,
114
 or in the case of claw back of compensation, the period over which 
exposure to claw back would be considered adequate.
115
 Abstracting from those second-order 
details, an important difference between the two proposals is the expected dimension of any 
desirable behavioral response.
116
 Exposure to claw back of bonus or performance-based 
compensation would provide payoff profiles comparable to that of common shareholders. There 
would thus remain an incentive for labor to place asymmetric bets, although that incentive would 
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not be as severe as it is when labor is not exposed to loss. In fact, an element of such exposure is 
already realized to the extent executives, in particular, receive share compensation, and this 
compensation structure did not deter excessive risk taking in the build up to the crisis.
117
 
Bebchuck and Spamann’s reform proposal would avoid this effect to the extent that 
compensation is dependent on the value of interests of stakeholders other than common 
shareholders.
118
 However, its proposed application would appear to be limited to the highest 
levels of financial firm management, perhaps because the complexity of designing a 
compensation structure tied to the interests of stakeholders other than common shareholders is 
seen to be worthwhile only for key decision makers. Because of greater simplicity of second-
order design details,
119
 a claw-back mechanism would probably be much easier to apply through 
the entire ranks of a financial institution, including traders and other front office personnel who 
also have considerable decision leverage in the use of firm assets.
120
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These two proposed reforms to the structure of compensation in the financial sector are 
not mutually exclusive; and they could be implemented as part of prudential regulatory regimes. 
Taxation of bonus and performance-based compensation intended to encourage adoption of 
compensation structures with either or both of these suggested features would be required only 
where they are not incorporated as part of prudential regulatory regimes and are left to market 
practice.
121
 Bebchuck and Spamann argue, for example, that existing regulatory regimes could 
accommodate consideration of compensation structures in setting risk-weighted capital 
requirements.
122
 Where regulatory regimes are incomplete, a tax instrument could be used either 
as part of a tax base measuring returns to risk in the form of rents or as a stand-alone tax. With 
either tax instrument, compensation in excess of a specified level could be subject to tax to the 
extent that it was not subject to a defined claw back or not suitably weighted to account for 
interests of stakeholders other than common shareholders. This type of tax would be preferable 
to a denial of a deduction for income tax purposes at the employer level, primarily because the 
rate could be set independently of the income tax rate of a particular employer, as well as 
independently of the income tax rate faced by particular employees. Experience with the denial 
of a deduction for compensation of senior executives of public corporations in excess of $1 
million would tend to support the presence of a behavioral response in the form of a change in 
the structure of targeted compensation.
123
 It is not clear, however, what rate should be used with 
an excise tax on bonus and performance-based compensation where the purpose is to induce a 
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reduction of risk taking to a level that is socially optimal in the sense that private and social 
marginal costs are equated. As with the choice between prudential regulatory regimes and 
corrective taxation generally, the same informational constraint applies equally, but a regulatory 
response may again be the preferable policy instrument if the social marginal cost curve 
associated with excessive risk taking is steeper than the private marginal cost curve. 
To the extent that prudential regulatory regimes incorporate requirements governing 
compensation and thereby serve the same function as a tax instrument intended to alter the 
structure of compensation,
124
 the principal goal of a special tax on financial sector compensation 
becomes the raising of revenue, and any desirable behavioral response should be seen as entirely 
secondary because of the use of comparable regulatory mandates.
125
 This revenue-raising 
function could again be realized either as part of a base intended to tax returns to risk taking by 
the financial sector or as a stand-alone tax on bonus and performance-based compensation.
126
 But 
as with the taxation of returns to risk taking generally by the financial sector, the revenue 
imperative is muted by the adoption of a bank leverage tax. Moreover, the attempt to tax bonus 
and performance-based compensation, in particular, is susceptible to shifting of key personnel in 
the absence of a multilateral response. A tax on compensation in the financial sector intended to 
alter compensation structures would, of course, be much different in the articulation of the tax 
base, and in its motivation, than the temporary bonus taxes introduced by the United Kingdom 
and France. Because of the exception for the portion of compensation that is suitably structured, 
such a tax might be able to be adopted unilaterally by a country without undesirable shifting of 
its incidence or shifting of the location of employees and/or operations. The United Kingdom and 
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France acted bilaterally to avoid the latter,
127
 but the temporary nature of the tax appears to have 
caused shifting of its economic incidence, with anecdotal evidence that firms grossed up or 
otherwise altered compensation levels to hold affected employees harmless from the tax.
128
 This 
practice might not be as prevalent in the presence of a tax targeting compensation structures. 
Provided that this type of tax applies across a wide range of financial sector personnel, nontax 
factors dictating a presence in a country could tend to act as a more effective binding constraint 
on tax-driven migration.  
V. CONCLUSION 
This paper considered three possible taxes on the financial sector post crisis: bank 
leverage taxes, taxation of returns to risk taking, and an excise tax on bonus and performance-
based compensation. It was suggested that the ability of bank leverage taxes to realize relatively 
modest revenue goals, while potentially providing a desirable behavioral response, makes their 
use as the tax instrument of choice of policymakers unsurprising. And given this policy 
preference, the rejection of taxation of returns to risk taking in the financial sector is similarly 
unsurprising. In the presence of bank leverage taxes, adoption of this additional tax base must be 
motivated by revenue generation concerns that are not as precisely quantifiable, and in the 
absence of a clearer revenue imperative, its weak behavioral properties have diminished its 
appeal.  Although excise taxes on bonus and performance-based compensation have been largely 
disparaged in the literature as politically motivated, a plausible case can be made for this base as 
an instrument to alter the structure of compensation. The failure to adopt such a tax may be 
attributable, in part at least, to redundancy where constraints with similar intended effects can be 
imposed through regulatory regimes.  
                                                 
127
 See Doina Radulescu, The Effects of a Bonus Tax on Manager Compensation and Welfare (CESIFO 
Working Paper No. 3030 Apr. 2010), available at www.CESifo-group.org/wp (finding that a bonus tax is 
borne by bank shareholders where relocation possibilities exist but the results may be reversed where 
relocation possibilities do not exist). 
128
 See George Parker & Megan Murphy, UK Fails to Alter Bank Bonus Culture, FINANCIAL TIMES, Jan. 
6, 2010; Sara Schaefer Munoz, David Gauthier-Villars & Martin Vaughan, France Joins UK Bonus Tax; 
Not Germany, US, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2009.  
